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Summary of Conclusions |
1.
If global unity is ever to be achieved, the United Nations has to be seen
to be a democratic and pragmatic actor in world affairs. Its toothless
resolutions (1267) since 1999 against Afghanistan, the Taliban and Osama
Bin Laden remind one of the League of Nations, that is to say ineffective,
and have led to a false sense of peace and harmony in world security.
2. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should be revamped, performing
a more democratic role than its current one, which comprises just 5 permanent
members - China, France, Russia, the UK and the US - and ten rotating
members. The new UNSC should be more reflective (especially in terms of
voting rights) of global political, economic, social and religious groups
and should provide the basis for a more democratic input and a more pluralistic
output.
3. Other sub-organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB),
should also reflect their Articles of Association and Charters better
by including a less capitalist bureaucracy in what Weber`s apolitical
idealism characterises as the "subordination of economic science in
political goals" (Beetham: 1985: 39). They should also
provide a more democratic base for the future wealth of the nations they
serve; by doing so, they will ensure that they are not open to accusations
of supporting the current hegemony.
4. Multilateral agencies such as NATO/IMF/WB should also be utilised
for the implementation of UN resolutions. This should incorporate a greater
cohesion and convergence of duplicated resources. For example: although
NATO is fulfilling the role of (western) military 'provider' in Afghanistan,
the UN also has a military role and this could be augmented by a multinational
police force and special forces attachments available at a moment's notice
to resolve conflicts around the world.
5. Member states should allow UN law primacy over domestic laws in
order to allow UN law to become less of a contract and more of a binding
agreement (Factortame case:
1988 Merchant Shipping Act: Case 246/89r; Weatherill and Beaumont: 1994)
to be enacted within individual member states, in the same binding
manner that European law has over its member states (UK European Communities
Act: 1972: section 2(1)). This could be used, for example, to trace and
detain international terrorists, and enacted as a condition of membership.
6. Another arm of the UN is the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
which has been used for the detention and trial of war criminals. It would
not involve a large-scale modification to the system to include international
terrorists within the category of those liable to prosecution, with an
international warrant served for extradition solely to the ICJ (Coleman: 2001).
7. Terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals (as alleged with Bin
Laden), by groups (as alleged with Al Queda), or by states (e.g. South
Africa's systemic apartheid regime). The UN International Court of Justice
(ICJ) could play a major role in the trial of international terrorists,
where it could act as an independent arbiter of alleged crimes by individuals
and groups. It could also function as a court where individuals and groups
could take grievances for redress against states. This twin purpose could
serve both to demilitarise terrorism as we currently know it and to reduce
violence as the only means of redress against such grievances.
8. It is time to formulate legal definitions on 'terrorism' (and 'good
governance'), so that the various structures and systems of the UN and
the multilateral agencies can clearly identify a singular rule of law
and adoption. This would be particularly useful for the sharing of intelligence,
as highlighted by the EU`s recent failure to agree on a common foreign
and security policy regarding terrorism.
9. Despite the claims for a 'coalition', little information has been
revealed about any members actually contributing anything to the "War
on Terrorism" - except for the UK and the USA. This over-exposure is a
weakness in the putative coalition's strategic goals, which could suggest
that the two principal parties have other agendas. These are outlined
in points 10-12 below .
10. All of the international organisations adhere closely to the adoption
of what Bray and Bray have called "the age of transperialism" (Bray & Bray 1998).
To allow such hegemonic policies to go unabated will ultimately be self-defeating
for the West, as it will lay itself open to accusations of dual purpose;
unless, that is, it seeks to reduce its controlling grip on world affairs
by increasing the democratic mandates of multilateral agencies.
11. The Russian giant Gazprom delivers approximately 1/4 of the world's
gas supplies through the Black Sea, whilst British Petroleum is hoping
to compete with its Trans-Caspian pipeline for the high energy demands
of Turkey. The Americans have already asked and been refused consent (by
the Taliban) to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan,
thus securing a link to their markets in Pakistan and India (Ostrovsky: 1999). The Asian nations will, ultimately,
consider the eventual building of this pipeline in Afghanistan to have
been the main cause of this conflict and to have been a determining factor
in the invasion of Afghanistan, thus setting a dangerous precedent for
the future.
12. On the balance of evidence it appears that Taliban 'democracy'
in Afghanistan was allowed to prevail, from at least 1996, on condition
that the possibility of capitalist gains from a future pipeline remained.
The repressive regime of the Taliban was tolerated only until it would
not deliver the pipeline access. It is a sad indictment of the current
state of global affairs that economic objectives are seen as more important
than either democracy or peace.
The US now has to face up to the realism that is terrorism and recognise
that its foreign policy, when compared to its domestic policy and constitution,
is not a just one. The United States has to decide whether it wishes to
defend democracy or capitalism most, since that is what appears to be
most at stake, with plans underway - before an Afghan government has even
been formed - for the extension of the Trans-Caspian pipeline running
through Afghanistan .
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are perceived by many to be equally
reprehensible, and are seen by many in the Islamic world to be profiting
from the current "war on terrorism" - especially oil companies, who will
benefit most from the proposed Afghan pipeline. Other TNCs not linked
to the pipeline will be rightly worried about how their markets will be
affected by this anti-TNC sentiment in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and concern
for their future operations could be defused by the voluntary supply of
services to local community initiatives in fields such as healthcare and
education.
We should, further, recognise the undemocratic accountability of such
parties to be inadequate at all levels. The "mother of democracy" - the
UN - should take a lead role in providing delivery systems for dealing
with the accountability of terrorism. In the first instance, then, it
is critically important to recognise the difficulties inherent in combating
terrorism and to formulate ways of co-ordinating: a legal definition of
what constitutes terrorism; an enforcement application; an examination
of current rules and regulations; a fair grievance and redress system;
and, last but not least, the removal of the root causes.
Copyright S Coleman 2001 30 November 2001
| Beetham (1985) Max
Weber and The Theory of Modern Politics Blackwells Oxford Bray & Bray (1998) 'Scholarship in the Age of Transperialism' Latin America Perspectives Issue 103 vol.25 no.6 November 1998 Coleman, S (2001) Ostrovsky, A (1999) 'Corridor for the supply of energy to the Caspian Region' Financial Times 23 November Weatherill,S & Beaumont, W (1994) E.C.Law Penguin London |
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